Female Central Bank chairs represent but a tiny minority. To understand why, this article analyzes socio-economic and socio-political characteristics of the countries where women have chaired Central Banks. Then, it suggests that gender differences in preferences as regards monetary policy goals may have some influence. An innovative econometric methodology, which does not require estimating all the structural and preference parameters of a monetary model, but only how men and women"s parameters differ, is developed to test this hypothesis. The results show that female Central Bank chairs focus more than their male counterparts on achieving the price stability goal. This means, then, that women are more resistant than men to political pressures. Finally, it concludes that gender differences in degree of conservatism may be an explanatory factor in female underrepresentation in the Central Bank chairs.
Introduction
« Mr. Summers and Mr. Yellen... euh, Ms. Yellen ».
This slip of the tongue by President Obama speaks volumes about women"s absence in the world of central bankers (Perlberg, 2013) .
As known, Central Banks are among the largest institutions in modern economies. In charge of defining and implementing of monetary policy, they determine the stock of money in circulation, set the level of short rates and perform the essential public functions (management of foreign exchange reserves, banking supervision). Central Bankers" actions have an immense impact on the functioning of our economy. But, until recently, women were deeply underrepresented in Central Banks. It seems that women have greater access to positions of responsibility in politics than in Central Banks where the glass ceiling is tougher. For instance, in Europe, among the 23-member policy board and the six-member Executive Board 2 of the European Central Bank (ECB), there are no women at all. Since its creation, the ECB"s Executive Board has included only two.
The literature has just begun to worry about women"s absence in monetary policy making (Chappell and McGregor, 2000) . Most of the existing studies focus on the composition of the Monetary Policy Committees (MPC). They are related to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the US Federal Reserve and the Board of the European Central Bank (ECB). The main idea is that the diversity in the MPC, in terms of gender, but also of age, of professional, sectoral and academic backgrounds, can influence the monetary policy decisions (Farvaque et al., 2014 , Masciandaro et al., 2016 . In particular, it points out that women"s presence in the MPC could have an important effect on policy outcomes (Chappell et al., 2005; Farvaque et al., 2011; Bennani et al., 2015; Masciandaro et al., 2016) . The findings obtained by the empirical literature highlighted a higher share of women in the MPC is associated positively with price stability.
In others words, in their decisions, female monetary policymakers are rather inclined to fight against inflation. To explain this attitude, it is observed that, from some level of responsibility, women seek to prove that they can be tougher than men. In particular, as central bankers, they need to make or to acquire a reputation and credibility. Hence they are invited to have hawkish rather than dovish attitude (Wilson, 2014; Hix et al., 2010; Farvaque et al., 2011 Farvaque et al., , 2014 Eijffinger et al., 2015; Masciandaro et al., 2016) . Thus, higher women"s presence in MPC is associated with better performance in terms of price stability.
enjoy, governments want someone with preferences compatible with theirs to chair Central Banks. Commercial banks wish to know the Central Bank chair appointed to ensure that the preferences are not in conflict with their own interests.
Indeed, according to the economic theory of bureaucracy, people are driven by self-interest, and appointing them as central banker does not change his nature. In others words, Central Banks" decisions can be politically expensive (Toma and Toma, 1986) . Hence, the rational choice(s) made by governments when appointing Central Bank chair with particular profiles (Chang, 2006) . This rationality can be extended to commercial banks concerned to preserve 4 their interests. In the light of the effects of central bankers" decisions, we assume that the women"s absence from Central Bank chairs can be accounted for by their version to inflation.
In this respect, this paper examines female Central Bank chairs" degree of conservatism, as defined by Rogoff (1985) , with respect to their male counterparts. For that purpose, an innovative econometric methodology, which does not require estimating all the structural and preference parameters of a monetary model, but only how men and women"s parameters differ, is developed to measure the influence of gender"s role in central banking. But first, it is worth to note that only a minority of women have managed to break the glass ceiling to reach the chair of the Central Bank.
A minority of female Central Bank chairs
A close scrutiny of Central Banks" organization charts reveals that they are overwhelmingly chaired by men. The oldest among them, the Swedish Riksbank (founded in 1668), has never been chaired by a female 1 
The socio-economic indicators
They concern the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Gender Inequality Index (GII). 
Inequality gaps between men and women
Those are measured by the Gender Inequality Index (GII), which provides a measure of the losses in terms of human development caused by inequalities between women and men in the three dimensions of reproductive health, empowerment and the labor market. Its value varies from 0 (situation in which women have a salary equal to men) to 1 (situation in which the status of women is as bad as possible).
By crossing available data from tables 1 and 2, among the 56 female Central Bank chairs:
Five (8.9% of the total) are from 4 countries, out of the 15 (0 ≤ GII < 0.1), where the treatment of women is almost identical to that of men; nine (16.0%) from 8 countries, out of the 35 (0.1 ≤ GII < 0.3), where the treatment of women is similar to that of men; twenty-two (39.3%) from 15, of the 52 countries (0.3 ≤ GII < 0.5), where the treatment of women is quite remote from that of men; seven (12.5%) from 7 countries, out of the 85 (0.5 ≤ GII), where the treatment of women is very remote from that of men.
These different distributions indicate that the socio-economic indicators of female/male inequality gaps, as measured by the Gender Inequality Index (GII), have more influence than the level of human development, measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) for the access of women to Central Bank chairmanship. This distribution helps establish a relationship between the relative importance of the females" political representation and their appointment as Central Bank chairs.
Socio-political characteristics
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As for the nature of the organization of the political system, countries can be divided into four subsets of political systems 5 (western-style democracies, former popular democracies, monarchies, others): process (Alesina and Giuliano, 2013) . By and large, these factors can be approached in reference to the geographical location of countries. (1) Argentina (1) Thus, the American continent has the highest proportion of female Central Bank chairs (39.2% of the total), followed by: Europe (25%); Asia, the Indian subcontinent and the Pacific (19.6%); Africa and the Indian Ocean (16.07%).
The weight of religion impacts the countries' development processes (Barro and McCleary, 2003) . In particular, according to the importance given to the family, the women"s status in the society, it can encourage more or less the female professional careers. If we take into account religion, countries with female Central Bank chairs are distributed as follows: As shown by table 1, there is a small minority of women in the closed world of Central Banks. This situation is partly due to the fact that appointing Central Bank chairs is strictly the government or parliament prerogative. Hence, it would appear important to focus on the profile of appointed female Central Bank chairs. 
Female Central Bank chairs: academic and career backgrounds
To analyze the profile of female Central Bank chairs, we collected biographical data available from the websites of national Central Banks and supplemented them with those available from other websites. Data are summarized in table 6.
Central Bank chair preferences, on monetary policy goals, are influenced by their career background. That is the case when he is encouraged to express his loyalty to some lobbies, an industry, a political party or a bureaucracy. In particular, a past career as Central Bank staff may encourage executives to identify their own interests with the Central Bank"s goals.
Indeed, as an institution, the Central Bank seeks to build up a reputation and maintain credibility. Those reputation and credibility are based on its ability to fulfill its mission, mainly summarized by maintaining price stability. Compared to a previous career as a politician or official (including international civil servants), the Central Bank chair is prompted to a stronger preference for price stability 6 . 14 Thus, a vast majority of female Central Bank chairs held various positions in the Central Bank before being appointed. Many worked in the public and private sectors and they had experience in the banking and financial sectors. A significant proportion was very active in politics. It would thus seem that the profiles of these female Central Bank chairs seem to tilt the preferences in favor of price stability.
The ability to understand economic and inflation mechanisms depends on their academic background. From a Public Choice perspective, the Central Bank chairs are driven by their own narrow professional perspectives and ambitions. With an economist"s profile will normally have an advantage enabling him to influence policy decisions in favor of his own preferences or specific targets (Acheson and Chant, 1973) . A more business-oriented training (managers, engineers) will predispose the Central Bank chair to greater aversion to inflation.
Indeed, price stability is a major asset for the economy and business development (Mishkin, 2007) .
The academic background data for female Central Bank chairs reveal (see table 6) that 40.8% of them hold a PhD or equivalent (in economics for 31.2% for them against 10.4% in business and management); 48.98% hold a Master"s degree or equivalent (including 31.25% specialized in economics and 18.7% in finance or business administration or commerce); 6.12% a specialized Bachelor or equivalent in economics, finance, commerce or accounting techniques; 4.08% another diploma or certificate (accounting, engineering).
Thus, female Central Bank chairs mostly possess technical skills to influence monetary policy decisions in the direction of their preferences. Even if a significant proportion holds a business-related diploma, it would be premature to infer their preferences between various potential monetary policy goals. Overall, the analysis of data related to the female Central Bank chairs career background leads us to the conclusion that, concerning the monetary policy goals, their preferences mostly go towards price stability. The examination of their academic training shows that they have the ability to assert their preferences. However, only the results of the empirical analysis can robustly establish the exact nature of their preferences with respect to price stability, in comparison with male Central Bank chairs. To this aim, the model we are presenting hereafter has been designed to estimate the policy parameter of female Central Bank chairs compared to their male counterparts.
Gender and the inflation/output trade-off
In the literature about the optimal monetary policy, it is standard to assume that monetary authorities operate by following a targeting rule, as defined by Svensson (1999) .
The Central Bank chair is supposed to minimize a quadratic loss function t L , which penalizes deviations of the objective variables from their target. Let us assume that these objective variables are the output gap t x (the deviation of the actual GDP from its potential value) and the inflation rate t  , which the Central Bank chair wants as close as possible to zero and the inflation target  . The quadratic loss function is specified as
where  is an intertemporal discount factor and  represents preferences of the Central Bank . This is because we suppose that t  does not depend on the current monetary policy. Due to delay of the monetary transmission mechanism, the monetary policy cannot influence the contemporaneous value of the inflation rate, ant it operates only on one-year forward inflation rate anticipation. Apart from that, Eq.
(1) is conventionally interpreted; the higher  , the less conservative the Central Bank chair is in the sense of Rogoff (1985) . Our aim is to estimate the value of  for female Central Bank chairs comparatively to their male counterparts. Are female Central Bank chairs more, less or as conservative as men?
The Central Bank chair is supposed to control the output gap t x . At first sight it may seem too strong a hypothesis, but it is in fact a common tacit assumption in monetary models, the policy-maker setting the interest rate to control the output gap (see for example Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1999) . With this assumption, we will not need to specify a demand or "IS" curve.
This is clearly an advantage as our results are independent of the demand equation specification. The only structural equation we need to specify is a New-Keynesian Phillips equation, which is supposed to be of the form 16 where t E is the expectation operator, conditional on information available at date t, and 1 t u  is a supply shock, eventually autocorrelated. In this forward-looking formulation of the Phillips equation, output gap affects the inflation rate with one-year lag, which is consistent with annual data according to Svensson (1997) . Eq. (2) is grounded on dynamic general equilibrium theory, which keeps the Lucas critic away, and apart from the fact we suppose that there is a control lag of one year, it is of the same form as the Phillips curve considered in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) .
The policy problem is to choose a time path for t x which minimizes the loss function (1), subject to the constraint (2). This problem reduces to minimizing
, the controllable part of (1), subject to (2). The first order condition of this problem
When the expected inflation rate is above (below) target, the Central Bank reduces (raises) the output gap. The aggressiveness of this response depends on parameters  and  . The response is more aggressive if the influence of output gap on inflation is high (  is high), and if the conservatism of the Central Bank chair is more pronounced ( 1   is high). This last parameter is likely to depend on the personality of the policy maker. It may also depend on the economic, political context in which the Central Bank chair is doing his or her job.
Let
 
denote the inflation forecast error. Eq. (3) can be rearranged
Eq. (4) it can be either 
The generalized model of the inflation/output trade-off is then
For Estimating the policy preferences by the way of running the regression equation (5) is a much more simple methodology than those used in the literature (see Cecchetti and Ehrmann, 2002 , Favero and Rovelli, 2003 , Ozlale 2003 , Castelnuovo and Surico, 2003 , Tachibana 2004 , Krause and Méndez, 2005 , Dennis, 2006 . In these aforementioned studies about the estimation of Central Banks" preferences, an identification problem arises, due to the nature of the objective. In effect, the common objective to all these studies is to get an estimate of the preference parameters. It requires estimating all the structural and preference parameters in order to recover the preference parameters from the reduced form of the model. On the contrary, our methodology is simpler (and presumable more robust to error specification) because we do not try to estimate the preference coefficients F  and M  but only to estimate 18 how they differ. To do so, we don"t need to estimate the structural parameter  ; it is not even necessary to estimate an aggregate demand curve. The basic principle of this methodology is borrowed from Diouf and Pépin (2010) .
Estimation of policy preferences are usually based on estimation of all policy and structural parameters. These traditional estimation procedures require an estimation of the structural macroeconomic model and an interest rate rule, in order to recover all the parameters (Favero and Rovelli, 2003 , Ozlale, 2003 , Castelnuovo and Surico, 2003 , Dennis, 2006 , or of the structural macroeconomic model and the first-order equation of the loss function"s minimization (Favero and Rovelli, 2003, Tachibana, 2004) , using an approach close to ours.
Another approach is to estimate the structural macroeconomic model and to use an estimation of the variances of inflation and output gap to recover the preference parameters (Cecchetti and Ehrmann, 2002, Krause and Méndez, 2005) . More simply, we focus on the first-order condition, which solves the optimization problem faced by the Central Bank chair. Our methodology is also distinctive in preferring a forward-looking model to a backward-looking one, and using annual data (instead of quarterly data).
Estimating Eq. (4) and testing the significance of  (the OLS estimator of  ) is then sufficient to find out if female and male Central Bank chairs behave similarly way or not, and in case they don"t, to infer about their differences. Theoretically, we can run such a regression for every country to assess the differences between women and men. For every country, we can estimate the country parameters  and  . The drawback of running individual (country) regressions is that the individual estimators  will be imprecisely estimated if the number of observations characterized by 1 d t  is low. And it is in fact the case for almost every country that this number is very low, because of the overrepresentation of men in the Central Banks" management. If we estimate  country by country, the variance of  would be high, and the estimated parameter would not be statistically significant, even if the true parameter is non zero. Thus we prefer to adopt an alternative estimation and test methodology, based on a panel data analysis. On the one hand, the drawback of such a methodology is to impose a restriction on country regressions that implies the existence of a common parameter; but on the other hand, using the panel sample produces a better estimate of this common parameter.
The panel model can be written 
A panel data analysis
The macroeconomic data used is from the FMI web site. At the time we picked up the data the last update was 03/2015. We use annual GDP data (valued at constant prices in national currency) and annual end of period consumer prices index 7 relative to thirty-three countries For every country j and every year t we set the dummy variable jt d to 1 if a female was the Central Bank chairman for at least six months. Otherwise the dummy is set to 0. In the initial data set, seven countries have a unique t d = 1 in 2014 (Cyprus, Israel, Madagascar, Maldives, Nigeria, Ukraine and the US). As inflation depends on monetary policy with a delay of one year, and because we have not the 2015 data yet, these countries don"t bring any information about the parameter of interest in this study (  ). This is why they are not included in the previous list of thirty-three countries.
Individual regressions
In order to select countries to be included in the panel analysis, individual regressions were run. For every country, Eq. (5) is estimated by OLS. include the trend in the regression. It is worth to note that the inclusion of the quadratic trend has little impact on the estimated parameters  and  , because the output gap is a de-trended series by construction. So the inclusion of quadratic trends has no consequences on the results; it only makes the residuals" autocorrelation disappear. Secondly, adjustments have also been made on the sample period. The theoretical model described by equations (1) and 21 (2) may be a good description of the monetary policy for some countries on a more recent period, but not since the early 1980s. The concept of a targeting rule is relatively recent, and few Central Banks in the world have followed such a rule since the early 1980s. For some countries included in the sample, it is obvious that the apparent inflation instability is not compatible with the inflation/output trade-off. In these countries, monetary policy was not intended to control inflation, even partially, but to fund public spending, this policy creating hyperinflation. Some of these countries have more recently regained control of inflation, and we do take these periods of stability into account when running the regressions. Argentina experienced instability of inflation process up to 1992. Before 1992, inflation measured with the logarithmic formulae, which underestimate inflation for high rates relatively to the index price growth rate, was over 60% (on the period 1980-1991). The inflation index fell from 1992 and was fairly stable since then. In Belarus, inflation has stabilized since 1996. Between 1993 and 1995, inflation was over 200% before dropping. In Kyrgyzstan inflation rate was over 200% in 1993 and 100% in 1994, before dropping in 1995. In Turkmenistan, inflation stabilized below 25% from 1998 onwards. The Polish inflation rate was unstable up to 1991.
In addition, in China and in Ecuador inflation stabilized respectively from 1995 and 2002 onwards, but as there was no more female Central Bank chair from these years, we didn"t shorten the sample period. Moreover, there is a lack of reliability with Paraguay"s inflation data before 1990. The reported inflation rate was exactly the same (23.58702) every year from 1980 to 1989; so we excluded this period of the sample. And finally, inflation was analyzed in Austria up to 1998, as the country entered the Euro zone in 1999. Table 7 Note: For every parameter, we present the estimated value, the standard error (into brackets) and the probability of the test of nullity of the estimated parameter, except for  , for which the probability is the one associated with the unilateral test of negativity. LM test refers to the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test; the first value is the statistics of the test and the second the probability of the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of residuals.
Panel regression
According to the results of the previous section, we selected eight countries (Argentina, Belarus, Guatemala, Guyana, Kyrgyzstan, Paraguay, Salvador and Turkmenistan) to estimate the non-linear panel model (6). The model is estimated using a non-linear SUR method, which exploits the errors correlation of the different countries. For every parameter, we present the estimated value, the standard error (into brackets) and the probability of the test of nullity of the estimated parameter, except for  , for which the probability is the one associated with the unilateral test of negativity.
According to Table 8 , panel estimation gives similar results to those of individual regressions. The restriction induced by the common parameter and the consideration of the error correlation does not seem to alter the results. Table 9 presents the main result of the paper:  is significantly different from zero, and it is negative, confirming the results of individual regressions, that female Central Bank chairs appear to put more emphasis on price stability than output stability in comparison to male Central Bank chairs. The estimated parameter  is even highly negative, the female Central Bank chairs being 73% less attached to the stabilization of output objective than men. Clearly, monetary policy appears to be less accommodative when conducted by female Central Bank chairs. This result of a larger degree of conservativeness associated with female Central Bank chairs is in line with previous analysis (see Bennani and al., 2015) .
In fact, we can even wonder if female Central Bank chairs are interested in output stabilization, as  is close to -1. We decided to test value of the statistics is 0.936, and the probability of a standard normal variable to be more than 0.936 is 0.175, which is the probability of the test. Thus the hypothesis that female Central Bank chairs don"t regard output stabilization, and are concerned only with inflation stabilization, cannot be rejected for a significance level of 10%, which assesses the importance of gender in central banking. 
Conclusion
Comparatively to the corporate boards, the gender of the Central Bank"s chair has not so far been a subject of academic work. The contribution of this study to the literature on gender and monetary policy is to provide a deep insight of the female"s under-representation among Central Bank chairs over the world, and to describe the way they resolve the inflation/output trade-off relatively to their male counterparts. To this aim, we have built a unique data set compiling information about female Central bank chairs since 1949. Our sample is larger and more recent than previous studies, and its originality lies in the fact that we included developed and emerging countries. Of course, there are other available data sets but they are incomplete or display some errors (misunderstandings about persons, confusions between Central Banks and national commercial banks).
From the data compiled, we identified 56 female Central Bank chairs, i.e. a very small minority. By using various international data about socio-economic indicators (level of human development, gender gaps) and socio-political characteristics (religion, traditions, political representation, political organization, geographical location), we found that: the female Central Bank chairs appointment was not influenced by the countries" level of human development; female under-representation, as Central Bank chairs, seems to result from tradition, religion and to the inequality gap with men, which is globally prevalent in societies.
As long as Central Banks were totally dependent of politics, roughly before the 1990s, the governments showed a clear inclination to appoint male Central Bank chairs. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Central Banks have become more independent and empowered to focus on the price stability goal, and governments started to appoint, more frequently, female Central Bank chairs, albeit always in a low proportion. Perhaps this is entirely due to the fact that the international movement of institutional monetary reforms coincided with a social change for women. Another explanation may simply result from female preferences on monetary policy goals in comparison with men. Indeed, while Central Banks were given independence, women selected to chair Central Banks have a career and an academic background consistent with a preference for the price stability, which leads us to think that the appointment of women may have been the result of a political will.
As only an empirical analysis can establish how female and male Central Bank chairs differ in the conduct of monetary policy, we examined if policy preferences are influenced by gender. We developed an innovative methodology, based on an idea first coined by Diouf and 27 Pépin (2010), which does not require estimating all the structural and preference parameters of a monetary model, but only how men and women"s parameters differ.
As a preliminary, the empirical analysis of the inflation/output trade-off reveals that, among the 33 countries in the sample, only eight appear to be consistent with a model of inflation targeting (Argentina, Belarus, Guatemala, Guyana, Kyrgyzstan, Paraguay, Salvador and Turkmenistan). Preferences cannot be inferred from the other twenty-four countries, as the implemented monetary policy in these countries does not seem to result from a compromise between stabilization of inflation and output growth. A panel data analysis conducted on the eight countries, whose monetary policy is consistent with inflation targeting, shows that female Central Bank chairs put more emphasis on stabilization of inflation comparatively to their male counterparts. Such a result is in line with previous studies on a larger degree of hawkishness from female. This is explained by the fact that female policymakers for monetary policy need to be more conservative, in their preference, in order to acquire/reinforce a reputation (Wilson, 2014; Farvaque et al., 2015) . They are 73% less attached to the objective of output stabilization than men, which reveals they have a high degree of aversion to inflation i.e. they are conservative in the sense of Rogoff (1985) .
Actually, female Central Bank chairs appear so hawk according to our results we cannot even reject the hypothesis that they are only concerned with inflation stabilization. This strong conservatism may be a factor explaining their appointment to the Central Bank chair, as the central banker"s conservatism has been advocated, on the basis of Rogoff"s work, as a way to gain in credibility and reputation. To some extent, this attachment to the ultimate monetary policy goal, reflected by a high degree of conservatism, can be interpreted as a sign of a greater ability to resist political pressures, and hence of independence in the conduct of monetary policy.
Nevertheless, we have to be cautious with the interpretation of these empirical results, because they are based on the empirical analysis of only eight countries which are mostly in the medium human development category. It will be interesting to repeat the estimation conducted in this paper within a few years, when more data about countries in the very high human development category are available.
